GitHub outage on Nov 3, 2026: incident with Git Operations

Reports during the incident

Every 15 minutes, 19:45 UTC to 23:45 UTC. Grey: normal. Red line: official incident.

19:45 UTC20:57 UTC22:41 UTC23:45 UTC

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GitHub's updates

Quoted from www.githubstatus.com

20:57 UTC
Investigating
We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Git Operations
21:37 UTC
Investigating
We have identified the issue impacting Git Operations and are beginning to roll out a mitigation. We will follow up with another update when we begin to see recovery.
22:05 UTC
Investigating
Our mitigation is rolled out and customers should start seeing improvements to Git Operations. We will continue to provide updates on mitigation status.
22:37 UTC
Investigating
We are seeing significant improvement, though some Git Operations may be slow for a small set of customers. We are marking this as mitigated and will continue to monitor.
22:37 UTC
Monitoring
The degradation affecting Git Operations has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.
22:41 UTC
Resolved
On November 3, 2026, between 15:00 UTC and 22:37 UTC, Git operations over HTTPS on GitHub.com were degraded. Clones, fetches, and pushes over HTTPS were slow, and some failed. For about half of Git HTTPS traffic, median response time rose from under 100 milliseconds to as high as 5 seconds. On average, the error rate was 0.65% and peaked at 1.29% of requests to the service. Git operations over SSH were not affected. This was due to a buildup of excess connections on the hosts that serve Git HTTPS traffic, which saturated their network capacity and caused slow and failed responses for all clients served by those hosts. We mitigated the incident by blocking a client traffic pattern at our load balancers and reloading them, which released the excess connections. The block also prevented some users of one third-party integration from performing Git operations over HTTPS until we removed it on November 4 at 13:26 UTC. We are working to alert on sustained Git HTTPS latency sooner and make load balancer mitigations take effect on existing connections immediately.

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GitHub's updates

20:57 UTC

Investigating

We are investigating reports of degraded performance for Git Operations

21:37 UTC

Investigating

We have identified the issue impacting Git Operations and are beginning to roll out a mitigation. We will follow up with another update when we begin to see recovery.

22:05 UTC

Investigating

Our mitigation is rolled out and customers should start seeing improvements to Git Operations. We will continue to provide updates on mitigation status.

22:37 UTC

Investigating

We are seeing significant improvement, though some Git Operations may be slow for a small set of customers. We are marking this as mitigated and will continue to monitor.

22:37 UTC

Monitoring

The degradation affecting Git Operations has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.

22:41 UTC

Resolved

On November 3, 2026, between 15:00 UTC and 22:37 UTC, Git operations over HTTPS on GitHub.com were degraded. Clones, fetches, and pushes over HTTPS were slow, and some failed. For about half of Git HTTPS traffic, median response time rose from under 100 milliseconds to as high as 5 seconds. On average, the error rate was 0.65% and peaked at 1.29% of requests to the service. Git operations over SSH were not affected. This was due to a buildup of excess connections on the hosts that serve Git HTTPS traffic, which saturated their network capacity and caused slow and failed responses for all clients served by those hosts. We mitigated the incident by blocking a client traffic pattern at our load balancers and reloading them, which released the excess connections. The block also prevented some users of one third-party integration from performing Git operations over HTTPS until we removed it on November 4 at 13:26 UTC. We are working to alert on sustained Git HTTPS latency sooner and make load balancer mitigations take effect on existing connections immediately.